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Abstract Private wealth holdings are likely to become an increasingly important
determinant in the job exit decision of elderly workers. Net wealth may correlate
with worker’s characteristics that also determine the exit out of a job. It is therefore
important to include a rich set of observed characteristics in an empirical model for
retirement in order to measure the (marginal) effect of wealth on the job exit rate.
But even with a rich set of regressors, the question remains whether there are time-
invariant unobservable worker’s characteristics that affect both net wealth and the job
exit rate. We specify a simultaneous equations model for job exit transitions with
multiple destinations, net wealth, and the initial labour market state. The job exit rates
and the net wealth equation contain random effects. We allow for correlation between
the random effects of job exit and net wealth, and the initial labour market state.
As instruments for wealth, we use survey information that measures ‘shocks’, like
shocks to the household’s financial situation during the previous year. Results show
an upward bias in the effect of net liquid wealth on retirement, but a small bias and a
positive causal effect if net total wealth (including housing equity and mortgage debt)
is used. Both measures of wealth show a significant positive effect on retirement. For
an average individual with age 58, an increase in net liquid wealth by 64,000 euros, or
in net total wealth by 110,000 euros, raises the exit rate into retirement by 1% point.
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1 Introduction
While population ageing puts current pension systems under financial strain, older
cohorts accumulate more private wealth than their predecessors until just a couple
of decades ago. Private wealth becomes an increasingly important financial resource
for the retired compared to social security wealth. Pension arrangements become
more flexible owing to institutional and financial innovation. It therefore becomes
increasingly important to know whether the private wealth holdings of households
influence the flow out of work of elderly workers.
Economic models (such as Kingston 2000) assign a positive impact of the level
of private wealth holdings on the flow out of work. French (2005) and Gustman and
Steinmeier (2005) estimate structural models of retirement based on the life-cycle
framework, including wealth accumulation.1 Van Ooijen et al. (2010) empirically
analysed the relationship betweenwealth and subjective information on planned retire-
ment with data from the DNB household survey (DHS), finding a small but significant
impact. Bloemen (2011) empirically analyses the impact of the private wealth level
of households on the job exit rate of elderly male workers in the Netherlands. The
analysis shows that workers with higher levels of net wealth have higher retirement
probabilities. The analysis was carried out with a rich set of regressors and includes a
sensitivity analysis of the results, such as the use of different measures of net wealth,
incorporating nonlinear wealth effects, checking for the impact of possible outliers
in net wealth, and varying the flexibility of the age pattern. Results appeared robust.
However, throughout the analysis the maintained assumption is that, after controlling
for all the observable regressors, there is no correlation in unobservables between the
level of net wealth and the job exit rate.
In this study, we analyse the role of unobservables in estimating the impact of
wealth on retirement outcomes. As we will see, both job exit rates and wealth exhibit
strong time-persistent individual- specific effects. As long as these random effects in
wealth and job exit rates are uncorrelated, a regression framework, as was carried out
in Bloemen (2011) to analyse the impact of wealth on job exit rates, remains valid and
even desirable because of its simplicity. However, to relax the maintained assumption,
we need a different modelling framework. This modelling framework needs, first,
to incorporate correlation in time-invariant unobservables between job exit rates and
private wealth. Second, we need to find instruments for private wealth. It is difficult
to find suitable instruments, as the (limited amount of) literature on instrumenting
wealth addresses diverse topics and is not very conclusive in suggesting possible
instruments. Third, a model framework that allows for random effects also requires
correction for selection into the sample, since the analysis of job exit naturally applies
1 There is related literature about the influence of wealth on job exit rates and search behaviour of the
unemployed (Danforth 1979; Lentz and Tranaes 2005).
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to the employed. Our aim is to set up a model framework that allows us to decompose
the total effect of private wealth into a causal effect and an effect that is channelled
through correlation in time-invariant unobservables. In the end, we will be able to
present elasticities of the total effect, the causal effect, and the bias due to correlation
in unobservables.
Before setting up such a model framework, we discuss the various a priori reasons
for correlation in unobservables between the level of net wealth and the event of job
exit. First, planned behaviour of households may play a role. Workers with a strong
preference to retire early may have accumulated savings throughout their working
life in anticipation of the early retirement. For such workers, we expect to see a
positive relation between the level of net wealth and retirement, but this is not a causal
effect of net wealth on retirement. If this mechanism of correlation in unobservables
prevails, we expect an upward bias in the estimated effect of wealth on retirement
if we do not incorporate such correlation in the estimation. Next, as pointed out by
Bloemen (2002), the level of net wealth may be correlated with (favourable) worker’s
characteristics that also influence job attachment, lay-off rates, and the attractiveness of
pension schedules. Neglecting unobservable correlation is expected to bias downward
the estimated impact of wealth on job exit, which may be particularly important for
job exit states like unemployment and disability. Finally, there may be observable
variables that are not observed in our data that can affect both the level of net wealth
and the exit out of a job. For instance, in the data we do not observe details of individual
pension arrangements.
In the analysis, we use data for the Netherlands from the Socio-Economic Panel
(SEP). We study the impact of wealth on job exit rates of elderly workers, distinguish-
ing ‘retirement’ and ‘unemployment’ and ‘disability’2 as states of destination. We
make this distinction since wealth a priori affects job exit rates to different states of
destination differently if ‘choice’ and ‘restriction’ play different roles. In the analysis,
two different net wealth measures are used. The first is ‘net liquid wealth’, and the
second, ‘net total wealth’ adds the value of the house and subtracts the outstanding
mortgage debt.
It is extremely difficult to find suitable instruments, since many individual charac-
teristics are potentially correlated with unobservables in wealth, being a stock variable
at the end of the working life. Since we are looking for instruments that are uncor-
related with a random, time-persistent, individual effect, suitable candidates can be
variables that are somehow related to shocks in the business cycle or at the individual
level. Our survey contains some indicators that are also generally used for constructing
measures of ‘consumer confidence’. For instance, we have subjective information on
the individual’s perception of the income development of the household in the past
12months. The indicators are highly correlated with movements of the business cycle.
They may represent shocks, or expectations about future shocks, to the household’s
financial situation that are unplanned and out of control of the household. These vari-
ables are shown to have predictive power for the level of wealth. To test whether they
also provide valid exclusion restrictions, we exploit the availability of multiple instru-
2 Labelled as ‘involuntary’ job exit later on.
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mental variables, and apart from estimating the basic model variant that excludes all
of the instruments from the job exit rates, we estimate for each instrumental variable
a model variant in which we drop the exclusion restriction and include the instrument
in the job exit rates. This way we can test the validity of the exclusion restrictions.
None of the exclusion restrictions is rejected.
Results show that the total effect of wealth which adds up both the causal effect and
the bias is quite similar to results obtained by Bloemen (2011) using a much simpler
regression frameworkwithout unobservables.3 It shows a positive and significant effect
of both measures of private wealth on exit into retirement while no significant effect is
found for exit into unemployment or disability. But with the present model framework
we are able to decompose the total effect into a causal effect and a bias. Decomposing
the total effect into a causal effect and a bias, we find that the sign of the bias is in
accordancewith the expectation spelled out above: the bias is positive (upward) for exit
into retirement and negative (downward) for exit into unemployment and disability.
For net liquidwealth a correlation in unobservableswith job exit is found, but the bias is
not estimated precisely, whereas the causal effect is significant neither. Thus, it remains
hard to assign the total effect either to a causal effect or to a bias. For net total wealth
(including housing equity and mortgage debt), correlation in unobservables is smaller
and not significant. For net total wealth, a positive causal effect on retirement remains,
while for exit into unemployment and disability a positive causal effect appears, once
the downward bias has been corrected for. One possible explanation for the more
pronounced effect of net total wealth on retirement is that net total wealth contains
more variation than net liquid wealth.4 Another explanation may lay in the nature of
housing equity and mortgage debt itself. A higher outstanding mortgage debt may
provide an additional incentive to stay on the job.
In Sect. 2, we present the data that are used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the
model. Section 4 presents the results of the estimation of the model. The final section
concludes.
2 The data
We use data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel collected by Statistics Netherlands
(SEP) for the years 1995 through 2002.5 Survey waves are available on a yearly basis
and refer to the month of May in each year. For the construction of our data on
job exit transitions, we select employed individuals who are observed in at least two
consecutive survey waves, such that we can observe changes in the labour market state
3 However, in the present analysis some additional variables are added. Particularly interesting is the
inclusion of subjective indicators for health status.
4 In particular, there are relative few elderly workers with financial (non-mortgage) debt.
5 The SEP originates from 1984. Only from 1987 on information about wealth holdings was collected. In
1990 a reform of the SEP took place, having a major impact on the collection of income data (from net
to gross), the frequency of the data collection (from every 6months to annually), and the month of data
collection. Only from 1995 on survey questions remained relatively stable, and in particular, for our purpose
we use a survey question on an extensive range of reasons for job exit that was included from that year. In
2002, the SEP survey stopped existing.
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from one year to another. Our model includes initial conditions for the labour market
state requiring observations on non-employed individuals. The first year of observation
will be used in the estimation of the initial condition for both the employed and non-
employed individuals. We selected male individuals appearing in any of the survey
waves in 1995 through2001 in the age range of 48 through64 reporting to be employed.
We use the subsequent wave to check the labour market state of the same individuals
in the next year.6 The upperbound of 64 was chosen since the usual retirement age in
the Netherlands is 65.
Ourmain outcome variable is job exit, but since netwealth has a potentially different
impact on different states of destination (see the discussion in Sect. 3.1) we split up
job exit by state of destination. To distinguish states of destination, we use a specific
question from the survey.7 Respondents that left their job are asked to report the
reason for their job exit from a list of possibilities. The most important reasons for
job exit listed are being fired, end of contract, shutdown of firm, illness/disability,
early retirement/living of one’s investments,8 pensioned, remaining (not specified any
further).
Pooling the (pairs) of waves with information on job exits results in 3711 pooled
(worker-year) observations on 1113 different workers. For the 3711 pooled observa-
tions of 1113 different individuals, we have tracked the labour market state the next
year: 208 (5.6%) of them are observed not to have a job the next year.Wemerged states
of destination into categories ‘retired’,9 ‘unemployed’10 and ‘disability’. The percent-
ages of job exiters exiting by these channels are 72.1, 15.9, and 12.0, respectively (see
Table 5).
6 An important condition is that information on the same individual is present in the next wave. Individuals
that are subject to attrition of any kind are dropped from the data. This requires the assumption that
unobserved factors in the attrition process are uncorrelated with unobservables in the determination of the
labourmarket state. Van den Berg and Lindeboom (1998) (and a couple of other studies by the same authors)
address the issue of attrition in panel data in the context of the estimation of labour market transitionmodels,
motivating that workers experiencing labour market transitions are more likely to leave a panel survey. Here
we have not corrected for attrition bias.
7 This survey question is available from 1995, which is an important reason why we start our analysis in
this particular year.
8 In Dutch: ‘rentenieren’.
9 ‘Retired’ includes job exit for the reason of ‘early retirement/living of one’s investments’, ‘pensioned’, and
‘remaining’. Note that the retirement categories are self-reported and that we cannot distinguish whether
someone goes on early retirement according to the narrow definition of the early retirement system, or
whether someone decides to live on interest. Moreover, the category ‘pensioned’ is also recorded by some
job exiters younger than 60, so it can indicate that the reported ‘being pensioned’ may also include early
retirement in the narrow sense. There is a category ‘remaining’ which does not further specify the reason for
job exit. The respondents could also report job exit for reasons like ‘marriage’, ‘taking care of the children’,
and ‘taking care of a family member’, but none of the respondents in our subsample reported any of these
categories as the reason for their job exit. The category ‘remaining’ does not include these types of reasons
for job exit, and since the categories that survey respondents may choose from are pretty exhaustive,
it seems likely that it refers to job quits, rather than job exit due to restrictions or involuntary reasons
like unemployment or disability. Since quits represent a choice, we decided to include it in the category
retirement. The category include 5.8% of the job exiters. A sensitivity analysis with the multinomial logit
model showed that the coefficients of wealth are hardly affected by reassigning those observations to the
other exit route.
10 Job exit for the reasons of being fired, termination of contract, and shutdown of a firm.
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Table 1 Observations used for initial conditions, sample descriptives
Variable Non-employed N = 572 Employed N = 1187 Mean difference
Mean SD Mean SD Mean (SE)




0.45 0.82 1.1 1.1 0.61**
(0.05)
Net liquid wealth (guilders) 53,110 126,191 60,504 146,294 7394
(Median) (15,177) (21,710) (7130)
Net total wealth
(liquid + illiquid)
184,256 267,331 269,514 498,213 85,258**
(Median) (85,044) (170,600) (22,232)
Non-labour income
(excl. asset inc.)
345 3565 495 6890 150
Lagged (monthly) (Median) (0) (0) (306)
Earnings spouse
(monthly, if employed)
1737 2762 1938 2815 201
(Median) (1299) (1641) (259)
Non-labour income
(excl. asset inc.)
68 6379 95 1259 27
Spouses (lagged) (Median) (0) (0) (56)
** Mean difference significant at 5% level
Selecting observations for the estimation of the initial conditions (selection into the
sample by the first year someone is observed in the survey) results in 572 and 1187
observations for non-employed and employed individuals, respectively. Note that we
use more observations on workers in the estimation of the initial conditions, since
we use less regressors, and consequently, the requirements for observability are less
stringent.Adding the observations for the initial conditions and the transitions together,
we use observations on 1759 different individuals and 4357 individuals-years.
Sample statistics for the sample of job exiters are in Tables 3 (continuous and count
variables) and 4 (dummy indicators). For the initial conditions, sample statistics can
be found in Tables 1 and 2. The background characteristics for job exiters come from
the year before the (potential) transition: if we use year t + 1 to determine whether
someone exited, the variables are from year t .11
11 For instance, if we select an employed individual in the age range 48–64 in the year 1995, we use thewave
in 1996 to check whether a job exit took place and use information on net wealth, marital status, pension
scheme participation, etc., from the May 1995 wave. However, since information on income refers to the
previous fiscal year, we use income information from the May 1996 wave, which refers to the calendar year
(January–December) 1995. Since the survey in May 1996 collects information on the wage income earned
in 1995 and also on the number of months worked in that year, we can determine the monthly earnings of
each individual in the year 1995, which is assigned to the monthly wage income earned in May 1995. In the
estimation, we make use of some ‘lagged’ income components from the May 1995 wave, which refers to
the year 1994. This example is for the years 1995–1996, but the same holds for any other pairs 1996–1997
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The longitudinal data set of the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP)12 provides aggregate
measures of assets and debts. The aggregate measures are computed by aggregating
information on several asset and debt categories. The value of total liquid assets is
obtained by Statistics Netherlands by aggregating the amounts on the current accounts
and savings accounts, bonds, stocks, money lent, value of jewellery, antiques, and
cars.13 Total debts (excluding the value of mortgage debt outstanding) are obtained by
aggregating personal loans at banks and credit institutions, loans to finance purchases,
and remaining (includingmoney borrowed from family and friends). Net liquid wealth
is computed by the difference between liquid assets and total debts. An alternative
Footnote 11 continued
through 2001–2002. Self-employed individuals are excluded: the survey does not apply the questions on
wealth to the self-employed. In the waves of 1995 through 2001, information on income in the previous
fiscal year is expressed in guilders. In the year 2002, the information on income has been collected in euros.
We have converted this information in euros to guilders by multiplying the amount by 2.20371 which is the
euros to guilder exchange rate.
12 The SEP is provided in both a compact longitudinal form and more extensive wave by wave. Both
variants are available to us, so any choice made in selecting the sample are not led by limitations of the
longitudinal data. We only use the longitudinal data to obtain the aggregate wealth variable according to
the definition set by Statistics Netherlands.
13 Not every household has possessions in each category. Money in current and savings account is most
common. Jewellery and antiques apply to few households only. In this paper, we only consider aggregate
wealth and not the relation between portfolio composition and retirement.
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measure of net wealth can be obtained by incorporating the value of the house and
the mortgage debt. By adding the value of the house and subtracting the value of
the mortgage debt from the value of net liquid wealth defined above, we obtain this
alternative measure of net wealth, which we will refer to as net total wealth.
Survey respondents are asked to provide information on separate income compo-
nents. This way we can construct a measure of non-labour income. Some of these
income components are related to income out of assets and are likely to be correlated
with the net wealth. We therefore construct two measures of non-labour income. The
first is non-labour income obtained from assets. This includes interest, dividend, and
annuity payments. In the estimation of the model, we do not include the level of this
variable, since it can be argued to be correlated with the random effect in wealth.
The other non-labour income variable consists of income obtained from family and
friends, income obtained from renting rooms, income out of alimony payments, and
housing benefits.
In Table 1, we find that the non-employed, within the age range from 48 through
64, are on average older and less wealthy than the employed. The final column of
Table 1 reports the results of a pairwise comparison of the means of the two groups.
The difference in age is significant, while the (on average younger) employed also
have a significantly higher number of children living in the household. The difference
in means between the employed and the non-employed for net liquid wealth is not
significant, but the employed have, on average, a higher net total wealth than the non-
employed. We also find that the spouse is employed less often, and if she is employed,
her earnings are lower.
We use indicators for the level of education ranging from primary education (level
1) to university (level 5). In addition, we use indicators for the sector that respondents
have been educated for, including technical, economic/administrative, general, and
services. These sectors can be observed for both the employed and the non-employed.
There are more lower-educated and less higher-educated individuals among the
non-employed (Table 2). The percentage of married men is lower among the non-
employed, whereas the percentages of single, divorced, and widowed men all are
higher.
For the job exiters (Tables 3, 4), the mean value of net liquid wealth is 62,782
guilders, whereas the median is 24,878. Net total wealth has a mean 282,224 and a
median value of 199,209. The average monthly wage income is 4729 guilders. The
value of the monthly wage is important not only because it measures current earn-
ings, but in the Netherlands, pension benefit systems are typically of the defined
benefit type and the future pension benefits are directly based on the final earn-
ings.14
In the Netherlands, the employee pension schedules are organized by collective
bargaining agreements at the sector level. Replacement rates and age of eligibility
14 We do not observe pension wealth in the data, but any constructed present value measure of future
pension benefits would be a function of the observed final earnings: pensions are of the defined benefit type
in the Dutch pension system. If we would like to construct a value for the pension wealth, we would need
to base this on the information we have on the observed earnings, the (not completely observed) properties
of the employees pension system, and assumptions about future expectations, including life expectancy. By
including the earnings, we may at least capture some of the impact of pension wealth.
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Table 3 Observations used for job exits, sample descriptives
Variable Mean SD
Number of observations: N = 3711 (worker-years)
Age 52.6 3.5
# Children living in the household 0.88 1.0
Pension premium (monthly, guilders) only for workers
participating in employee pension system and paying
premium directly
253 399
Pension premium (monthly, guilders) only for workers
participating in an individual pension scheme
407 640
Net liquid wealth (guilders) 62,782 143,244
(Median) (24,878)
Net total wealth (liquid + illiquid) 282,224 396,281
(Median) (199,209)
Net monthly wage income (guilders) 4729 3059
(Median) (4250)
Non-labour income from assets (monthly) 144 (931)
(Median) (0)
Non-labour income (other) 96 (1664)
(Median) (0)
Earnings spouse (monthly, if employed) 1918 (2317)
(Median) (1608)
Non-labour income from assets, spouse 831 (6868)
(Median) (0)
Non-labour income (other) spouse 112 (1367)
(Median) (0)
to early retirement benefits vary by sector. The survey contains detailed information
on the industrial sector of workers. Given the number of transitions observed, we
have aggregated information on industrial sectors in 12 categories. In addition, we
use indicators for the sector that respondents have been educated for. In the empirical
analysis, we estimate our base specification with these broad sectors, and we do a
sensitivity analysis with the more detailed industry dummies.
The survey contains limited information on participation in pension schemes. Each
respondent is asked to report whether he participates in an employee pension scheme.
Table 4 shows that this is the case for 89.8% of the respondents, whereas 1.8%
does not know the answer to this question. Usually, the pension premium is withheld
automatically from the salary by default. However, 4.1% of the individuals claim to
pay a pension premium directly. For these individuals, information is collected on
the premium contribution paid: the average contribution is 253 guilders. In 73.8% of
the cases, the employer contributes to the payment of the premium, according to the
survey respondents (Table 5).
Some individuals participate in an individual pension scheme, initiated by them-
selves. The motives for participating in an individual pension scheme can be quite
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Table 4 Observations used for
job exits, sample descriptives
(%)












No children in the household 46.9
‘Permanent’ job 96.0
Civil servant 32.0
Participating in employee pension scheme 89.8
Unknown whether part. in pens. scheme 1.8
Pays contribution directly 4.1
The employer contributes to premium 73.8





Employed spouse (sample percentage) 51.4





Production of machines, instruments 7.0
Construction 8.3
Retail and trade 8.9
Transport 8.1
Finance, commercial services 11.9
Public government, education 26.1
Health care 5.8
Remaining services, public utility 4.2
Other, missing 5.5
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Table 5 Job leavers:
self-reported reasons to exit
Number of job leavers 208






diverse and are not recorded in the survey.We can imagine that poor employee pension
schemes ormany job changes in the pastmay add to the participation in individual pen-
sion schemes, but an alternative motive may come from high-income people who have
more financial means to invest in individual pension schemes. In any case, someone
participating in an individual pension scheme has a certain awareness of his finan-
cial situation after retirement, and including information on participation in individual
pension schemes in the job exit rate may proxy this awareness as well as the ‘true’
impact of the pension scheme itself. We see that 15.6% of the respondents participate
in an individual pension scheme. The sample average of the monthly contribution is
407 guilders.
We have included some other properties of the job. We see that 32.0% of the
respondents characterize themselves as a civil servant. Early retirement schemes of
civil servants are known to be more generous and widespread than for workers in the
private sector. At this age, most workers (96.0%) have a ‘permanent’ job.
The survey contains subjective measures of the health status of individuals. Survey
respondents are asked ‘how, in general, is your health condition?’ They select one
answer out of the following 5 possibilities: ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘reasonable’, ‘bad’,
and ‘very bad’. Amajority of 61.4% answers to be in good health, while 17.3% report
to be in very good health, and 19.7% call their health reasonable. A minority reports
their health to be bad (1.5%) or very bad (0.08%). In the model, we will merge these
two categories of bad health and use it as the reference class.
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3 The model
3.1 The job exit rate: theoretical background
Blundell et al. (1997) and Bloemen (2007) show that net wealth enters the job exit
probability in a life-cyclemodel that allows for consumption, wealth accumulation and
savings, the trade-off between retirement and work, and uncertainty in the availability
of jobs. The choice to exit the job or to stay is based on comparing the levels of
the value functions associated with the alternatives.15 Let Vt (At , yt ; dt+1) denote the
value of choosing labour market state dt+1 at the end of period t (dt = 1 indicating
employment and dt = 0 indicating retirement) for someone employed at the beginning
of period t (dt = 1). At denotes the level of net wealth at the beginning of period t ,
and yt is the income in the current job that enters the function since it affects the
level of pension benefits in typical defined benefit plans (see the model formulation
in Bloemen 2007). The worker decides to exit the job if Vt (At , yt ; 0) > Vt (At , yt ; 1).
The labour market state affects the value function since it affects the accumulation of
pension wealth, the eligibility to retirement benefits, the level of income, and it has
a direct effect on utility. The probability16 that the worker decides to leave the job
is
P(dt+1 = 0|dt = 1, At , yt ) = P(Vt (At , yt ; 0) > Vt (At , yt ; 1)) (1)
Under some regularity conditions, the probability of exiting the job in a period t ,
conditional on the level of wealth at the beginning of the period, is increasing in the
level of wealth. We may want to extend the model with job exit due to demand side
shocks. If uncertainty in the availability of jobs is expressed by an exogenous lay-off
rate δt , then the probability that the worker exits the job in year t , conditional on being
employed at time t , can be expressed as17
P(dt+1 = 0|dt = 1, At , yt ) = δt + (1 − δt )P(Vt (At , yt ; 0) > Vt (At , yt ; 1)) (2)
The expression for the job exit rate (2) shows that according to economic theory net
wealth enters the job exit rate by the choice to exit the job and not by the lay-off
rate δt . For this reason, we will make a distinction between different exit routes in the
empirical analysis and distinguish retirement from alternative reasons for job exit, like
unemployment and disability. Kapteyn and De Vos (1998) argued that alternative exit
routes for elderly workers, like unemployment and disability, are financially attractive,
and job exit by these routes may occur in good harmony between the worker and the
15 We do not explicitly specify an economic model, but the value function can be interpreted as part of a
dynamic programming model, as for instance formulated in Kingston (2000), French (2005), and Gustman
and Steinmeier (2005). It may also be interpreted as an option value, conform Stock and Wise (1990),
although this model does not incorporate private wealth.
16 Here we have left the source of uncertainty unspecified, but income uncertainty is the usual source of
uncertainty specified in life-cycle models.
17 Note that the probability to stay on the job is (1− δt )P(Vt (At , yt ; 0) ≤ Vt (At , yt ; 1)) which adds with
(2) to 1.
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employer. Therefore, choice may not be completely absent as a factor determining the
job exit by any of these routes, and net wealth may affect the exit rate.
Accordingly, we specify an empirical model for (2), controlling for observable and
unobservable characteristics to isolate the causal effect of wealth, and distinguishing
different states of destination.
3.2 The empirical model
Our empiricalmodel describes transitions out ofwork into different destinations, along
with model equations for net wealth and the initial labour market state.
We use a multinomial logit model to analyse the impact of net wealth on the job
exit rate. To have a reasonable number of observations in each state of destination,
we made a combined exit route unemployment/disability. This combined exit route
represents job exit through other reasons than retirement. It represents job exits induced
by restrictions in either labour market conditions or health status. We are aware that
job exit for these reasons may contain a choice element, as discussed above, but for
ease of terminology we will label this exit route ‘involuntary job exit’ in the sequel.
An implicit assumption of the multinomial logit model is Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA). A practical implication for this assumption is that the two exit
routes that we distinguish, ‘involuntary exits’ and ‘retirement’, should not be (too
close) substitutes to each other. The reason why we make a distinction between these
two exit routes in the first place is that we a priori expect that our variable of interest
has a different impact on job exit in these different directions, because one direction
is more governed by choice while the other follows from health and unemployment
shocks. Moreover, eligibility conditions for exit in either direction are not the same.
In the model below, we also include random effects, and after averaging over random
effects, IIA in its pure form does not hold anymore (only conditional on the random
effect).
For an individual i selected in the sample in period t and whose labour market state
we keep track of in period t+1, we have three possible values for the outcome variable
dit : staying employed (E), retirement (R), and involuntary job exit (I ). The state of
employment is our base category, such that the probabilities we specify below are job
exit probabilities. If xit is a vector of explanatory variables, we specify the probability
of job exit to state J as
P(di,t+1 = J |dit = E, xit , αi ) = exp(xitβJ + γJαi )
1 + exp(xitβR + γRαi ) + exp(xitβI + γIαi )
(3)
with βJ , J = R, I the parameter vectors measuring the impact of the explanatory
variables xit on the probability of job exit to state J . The level of net wealth at the
beginning of period t , Ait , is included among the regressors xit . In (3), αi repre-
sents the unobserved individual-specific variation in job exit rates. We include one
individual-specific random effect αi , irrespective of the state of destination, as we
typically observe only one realized exit route for the job exiters in our sample. The
impact of the random effect on job exit is measured by γR and γI , depending on the
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state of destination.18 Since (3) is a nonlinear model, it suffers from the incidental
parameter problem (Neyman and Scott 1948; Greene 2004) if αi were treated as a
fixed effect.
Next, we formulate an equation for the level of net wealth. Since the empirical
distribution of net wealth is highly skewed, Burbidge et al. (1988) propose to use the
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to transform the level of net wealth. The inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation g(Ait , θ) on net wealth Ait is
g(Ait , θ) ≡ ln[θ Ait + (θ
2A2i t + 1)1/2]
θ
(4)
with θ a parameter.19 The transformation (4) has some convenient properties:
– If θ tends to zero, then g(Ait , θ) tends to Ait .
– Sign(g(Ait , θ)) = Sign(Ait ).
– g(Ait , θ) is monotonically increasing in Ait .
– g(Ait , θ) is symmetric in θ , so we can restrict θ ≥ 0 without loss of generality.
The equation for net wealth now becomes
g(Ait , θ) = z′i tδ + ωi + uit (5)
The net wealth equation contains an individual-specific random effect ωi and an
idiosyncratic error uit . We do not wish to interpret the equation for net wealth as
a structural, behavioural equation for wealth.20 The functionality of the net wealth
equation is to allow for correlation in unobservables between job exits and net
wealth.21
Supposing that we observe individual i for periods t = 0 through T , Eqs. (3) and (5)
constitute a simultaneous dynamic panel data model with random effects. The random
effects αi in the job exit rate andωi in the wealth equation are allowed to be correlated.
For period t = 0, Eq. (3) cannot be specified as it requires the labour market state
di,−1 and wealth level Ai,−1 in period t = −1. If there were no random effects in
the model, we could safely ignore the likelihood contribution for labour market state
18 The variance of αi , σα will be normalized to one accordingly.
19 The parameter θ will be estimated. In applications, the parameter θ is often set to 1. Note, however, that
it is not a priori clear whether this is an appropriate choice. Expression (4) shows that the appropriate level
of θ is influenced by the scale of net wealth. Since we estimate all the model parameters simultaneously by
maximum likelihood, there is no need to set the value of θ a priori, especially since (4) is a well-behaved
function of θ . In computing the likelihood, we have to be aware of the Jacobian of the transformation (4),
as shown in (11) in ‘Appendix 1’.
20 A more structural equation, for instance, may call for the inclusion of (transformed) lagged net wealth
among the regressors. If this approach is followed, an initial condition (that does not include lagged net
wealth) for net wealth needs to be added. But since the coefficient of lagged net wealth will be close to 1, it
will wipe out the random effect ωi in (5). The consequence would be that any correlation in unobservables
between net wealth and the job exit probability would run through the initial condition for net wealth. But
then the approach becomes largely equivalent to estimating a net wealth equation that does not include
lagged wealth.
21 Below we comment on exclusion restrictions.
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di0 and use the job exit probabilities for periods t = 1 through T . Since we include
a random effect selectivity into employment at t = 0 becomes an issue, and we need
to specify an initial condition for the labour market state di0 at t = 0. Bhargava and
Sargan (1983) advocate the use of simultaneous equations estimators in the context
of linear dynamic random effects models and discuss the initial condition problem.
Wooldridge (2005) provides solutions for the initial condition problem in nonlinear
dynamic panel data models with random effects, and our model fits in this class of
models. According to Wooldridge (2005), we formulate an equation for the labour
market state di0, conditional on the random effect. This equation does not contain
di,−1 (as it is not observed), so it is an equation for the labour market state as opposed
to Eq. (3) which specifies a transition probability. Because we are estimating transition
probabilities for the employed, this initial condition has the interpretation of a selection
equation: its estimation requires data on non-employed individuals, not selected into
the sample for transitions. The equation naturally also does not include the unobserved
Ai,−1, but, conformWooldridge (2005), the initial condition contains correlation with
the random effectωi in the wealth equation (as well as with the random effect αi in the
job exit equation), so this way selectivity into a labour market state related to wealth
holdings is incorporated in the model.
The equation for the initial labour market state di0, with di0 = 1 if individual i ,
selected in the sample in period t = 0, is employed and di0 = 0 if individual i is not
employed, is
d∗i0 = m′i0η + 
i0
di0 = ι(d∗i0 > 0)
(6)
with mi0 the explanatory variables, η the parameter vector that measures the impact
of the explanatory variables on the labour market state, and 
i0 the error term that is
allowed to be correlated with αi and ωi . Wooldridge (2005) suggests the inclusion of
the same exogenous variables22 inmi0 as in the job exit rate for t = 1. However, some
of the variables in the job exit rate are specific to the state of employment (like job
characteristics) and are not observable for the non-employed.
To allow for correlation in the unobservablesαi ,ωi , and 
i t , we assume they follow a

































The formulated model allows for correlation in unobservables between net wealth, as
a regressor included in xit in (3), and the unobservables αi . The remaining regressors
are assumed to be uncorrelated with the unobservables in the exit rates. Moreover, we
assume that the regressors zit in the wealth equation andmit in the initial condition are
uncorrelated with αi , ωi , 
i t , uit and the errors governing (3). Conform Wooldridge
22 It is important to note that the initial condition (6) does not require exclusion restrictions as it need not
to be instrumented: di0 is not a right-hand side variable in the job exit rate, but a left-hand side variable in
the chain of labour market states dit .
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(2005), we first specify likelihood contributions for individual i for periods t = 0
through T conditional on the randomeffects (αi , ωi ) using (7), afterwhichwe integrate
over the random effects. Details are shown in ‘Appendix 1’.
Having introduced the technical specification, it is important to discuss the interpre-
tation of the unobserved time-invariant variables αi and ωi and address the underlying
assumptions.
First, the time-invariant individual-specific variable αi may represent unobserved
individual-specific preferences concerning the trade-off between leisure and consump-
tion, which from a life-cycle perspective influences the individual’s preference for
pursuing a career job and the level of job attachment and work effort. Through this
channel, the job exit probability (or, reversely, the staying-on probability) is influ-
enced. Moreover, the individual’s preference for retiring earlier is affected directly
through preference for leisure.
The time-invariant variable ωi in wealth may come from individual-specific prefer-
ences that affectwealth accumulation, such as the rate of timepreference and the degree
of risk aversion. Individuals with a lower rate of time preference assign a higher weight
to future outcomes, which affects their propensity to accumulate wealth, whereas risk-
averse types have a stronger precautionary savings motive. Reversely, a high rate of
time preference can be associatedwith a low ability to plan and to accumulate sufficient
wealth.
Unobserved factors αi and ωi that, respectively, influence the exit from the labour
force and the wealth level are potentially correlated. Workers with a low rate of time
preference who lack the patience to accumulate wealth may also lack the ability to stay
in a career job and therefore have higher job exit rates. Not correcting for correlation
in unobserved factors would potentially bias downward the impact of wealth on job
exit. Since individuals with such unfavourable personal characteristics may be more
likely to exit the labour via unemployment or disability, we think that this downward
bias especially shows up in the impact of wealth on job exit in these directions. If
individuals have a life-time preference for retiring early, their wealth accumulation
may have been set accordingly. This mechanism would mainly affect the impact of
wealth on the retirement exit route and leads to an upward bias. Moreover, the rate
of time preference, affecting the individual’s ability to plan and save, also affects the
individual’s ability to plan retirement age.
In this framework, we allow for correlation in the unobservable individual-specific
and time-invariant variable in wealth and the job exit rate, but wemake the assumption
that the remaining explanatory variables are uncorrelated with these unobservables.
Nevertheless, some of these variables are also part of a life-cycle framework. For
instance, the level of education is usually set at the beginning of working life, but the
choice for education may very well be made under consideration of similar leisure and
consumption trade-offs. If someone with a high preference for life-cycle consumption
chooses to invest in a high degree of education before entering the labour force, this
affects the accumulation of wealth during working life and also the attachment to the
job. However, in this study we treat educational attainment as predetermined, as we
only look at job exit near the end of working life. Another variable that we assume
to be uncorrelated with the random effects is marital status and family composition.
These are variables that also may be part of a life-cycle plan, as family composition
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will interact with job attachment, while also savings motives are likely to be affected
by family composition (think, for instance, of the bequest motive). These are issues
that are not explicitly incorporated in the current approach.23 Thus, to the extent that
the random effects and the independent variables are correlated, the results in Sect. 4
need to be interpreted with caution.
3.3 Instrumenting wealth
We need instruments that predict wealth, but do not affect job exit rates indepen-
dently from wealth. In our model, the random effect is the main source of correlation
between wealth and job exit rates. Thus, to instrument net wealth, we need to include
variables in zit in the wealth Eq. (5) that are uncorrelated with the unobservables in
this equation. Such variables are extremely hard to find. There are some examples
known in the literature studying wealth in different contexts. Carroll and Samwick
(1998) instrumented wealth with occupation, education, and industry, in a study of
precautionary savings. Bover (2006) uses geographical variation in housing prices and
inheritance information about real estate properties, in a study of wealth effects on
consumption, with an emphasis on housing wealth. Dvornak and Kohler (2007) study
the impact of housing wealth and stock market wealth on consumption expenditures
and use first and second income lags as instruments. If we think that it is plausible
that the main source of correlation between unobservables in exit rates and wealth
is individual-specific random effects, a guideline to look for suitable candidates is to
search for variables that are somehow related to business cycle shocks. Such variables
can affect wealth in a specific period, but have little impact on the planned stock level
of wealth resulting from unobserved leisure-consumption trade-offs and preferences
for (early) retirement.
Our survey contains some indicators that are also generally used, for instance,
by Statistics Netherlands, for constructing measures of ‘consumer confidence’. The
survey respondents get subjective questions about their financial situation. In a first
question, they are asked to classify the development of the financial situation of their
household in the past 12months. There are five possible classifications: obviously
improved; somewhat improved; remained the same; somewhat deteriorated; obvi-
ously deteriorated. A second question is more specifically related to their income:
survey respondents are asked to classify the development of their income in the past
12months into one of the same five classifications. It seems plausible that information
obtained by these types of survey questions largely represents exogenous financial
shocks that are not necessarily correlated with the unobserved, time-persistent effect
that affects the accumulation of wealth over the life cycle. In a different question
respondents are asked: ‘Do you believe it is a favourable time now tomake large expen-
23 In a linear model, a standard way of testing whether explanatory variables are correlated with the random
effect is to employ a Hausman test that compares the more robust but inefficient fixed effects estimator with
the efficient random effects estimator. Since a fixed effects model suffers from the incidental parameter
problem, as noticed before, a Hausman test cannot be implemented here.
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ditures?’ Respondents can answer by choosing any of the following three classes: it
is a favourable time; neither favourable nor unfavourable time; it is an unfavourable
time. It is plausible that the response to this survey question correlates with the level
of net wealth, which actually is a desirable property for an instrumental variable (see
later). But in order to use this information as an instrument, we need to assume that
there is no unobserved variable that drives both the accumulation of wealth and the
response to this question about purchase opportunities at a specific point in time. Since
we have several instrumental variables in our data, we are able to test for the exclu-
sion restrictions statistically. In Sect. 4, we present estimates for the basic model that
imposes exclusion restrictions for all the instrumental variables, but for each instru-
mental variable separately we will also relax the exclusion restriction by including
the instrument in the job exit rates and re-estimating the model. Since our method
of estimation is maximum likelihood of the equation system for job exit rates and
wealth, this way we can compute the likelihood ratio test statistic to test whether the
exclusion restriction for the instrument is valid. Results are presented in Sect. 4 and
show that none of the exclusion restrictions are rejected. Thus, we test the validity
of the exclusion restrictions, irrespective of whether the underlying channel runs via
time-invariant unobservables or time-varying unobservables.
The previous three survey questions are also used by Statistics Netherlands to
construct an index of ‘consumer confidence’, as an indicator of the business cycle.
Usually, the answers to these questions show a large variation across the business
cycle. They represent ‘shocks’ in the household’s financial situation and the perception
of the individual about the developments in the economy.
Another question that is asked to survey respondents is ‘How well are you able to
make ends meet with your total (household) income?’ Respondents can answer by
choosing any of the following six classes: very difficult; difficult; somewhat difficult;
somewhat easy; easy; very easy.We think that, a priori, it is far less plausible to assume
that there are no unobservable variables that drive both the accumulation of net wealth
and the ability of a household to make ends meet. Those who are clumsy in dealing
with financial matters may very well both experience a low accumulation of net wealth
across the life cycle and problems in making ends meet. Note that the phrasing of the
survey question also does not, unlike the previous three question, contain a specific
time dimension or period context that make it plausible that this information represents
shocks. However, on the other hand, the outcome may also be related to household’s
financial restrictions that are exogenous to the household. It is unlikely that a poor
ability of households to make ends meet is a situation that is strongly persistent across
the life cycle, and the outcome of the survey question may also expose variation with
shocks and business cycle fluctuations. But also for this instrumental variable, we can
test for the exclusion restriction. In the empirical implementation, we will use this
latter instrument more as a robustness check and estimate the model both with and
without this additional information as an instrument for net wealth. It turns out that
results are robust with respect to the inclusion of this instrument. The bottom part of
Table 11 shows that the aggregate survey information of the instrumental variables
covaries with the business cycle indicators (consumer confidence and an index for
stock prices), which is consistent with the assumption that these variables capture
shocks.
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With first-stage regressions24 for wealth, F statistics were computed for testing
whether the indicators add anything to the explanation of wealth. We included the
same right-hand side variables as we will use in the estimation of the random effects
model (see later). We constructed dummy variables corresponding to the information
in Table 11: for the questions referring to the income and the financial situation in the
past 12month, we included four dummy variables for both in the regression; for the
question about the time tomake large expenditures, we included two dummyvariables;
for the question howwell the household manages to make ends meet, we also included
four dummy variables, since we merged the categories ‘very difficult’ and ‘difficult’.
We first did a first-stage OLS regression including only the variables that are most
likely to be related to shocks, i.e. the information about income and financial situation
in the past 12months, and whether it is a favourable time to make large expenditures.
We did the analysis both for net financial wealth and for net total wealth (including
the value of the house and the mortgage debt outstanding). In the text below, we report
numbers in brackets for the latter concept of net wealth. The F statistic for testing the
null hypothesis whether the 10 coefficients associated with these variables are jointly
zero is 18.1 (24.4). With a p value < 0.00, this indicates that the null hypotheses is
rejected and the dummy indicators do add to the explanation of wealth. Including the
variables increased the R-squared of the regression by 0.03 (0.03), which is not a very
large addition. This can be viewed both as good and as bad news. It is good news
for the interpretation of our instruments as shock variables: in general, explaining
a stock variable with shock variables leads to a low R-squared. The small addition
to the R-squared makes it less likely that our indicators may be correlated with the
random effect. The flip side is that a small explanatory power of the instruments may
make it harder to identify the causal effect of net wealth on job exit from the effect
that is running through the unobservable random effect: this can result in relatively
high standard errors of the coefficients of interest. Next, we have, in addition to these
instruments, also added the information on how well the household is able to make
ends meet. This leads to an F statistic of 718.0 (52.8), whereas the R-squared further
increases with 0.07 (0.07), meaning that now the total set of 14 variables explain an
additional 0.10 (0.10) of the R-squared.
4 Results
The parameter estimates of the multinomial logit model are presented in Sect. 4.1. In a
multinomial logitmodel, the parameters of the choice probabilitiesmeasure the relative
24 Note that our eventualmethod of estimation is full informationmaximum likelihood for the simultaneous
system of equations of job exit rates, net wealth, and initial conditions, rather than instrumental variable esti-
mation. In this context, the terminology first-stage regression is not appropriate, because there is no first and
second stage in estimating amodel by full informationmaximum likelihood.However,wefirst like to explore
the performance of the instrumental variables by estimating a single-equation model for wealth, before esti-
mating the full model. This single-equation model is estimated by OLS, ignoring the random effect in (5),
but it should be noted that the parameters of the wealth equation can be estimated consistently (although
not efficiently) as a single-equation model by OLS, under the same assumptions as hold for the full model.
For this purpose, we estimated the wealth Eq. (5) by OLS with parameter θ restricted to 1. In the estimation
of the simultaneous equations model by simulated maximum likelihood, we estimate the parameter θ .
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change in the choice probability as a result of a change in the explanatory variables.
To gain more insight in the size of the wealth effect, we present computations of the
marginal effects of wealth on the exit rates in Sect. 4.3. In this section, we also present a
decomposition of the total effect of wealth into a causal effect and a ‘bias’. We present
this decomposition both in terms ofmarginal effects and in terms of elasticities. Section
4.2 presents the outcomes of the tests for the exclusion restrictions.
4.1 Parameter estimates
Themodel Eqs. (3), (5), and (6)with the covariance structure in (7) have been estimated
simultaneously by simulated maximum likelihood using 60 replications to simulate
the integration over unobserved random effects. ‘Appendix 1’ shows the details of the
likelihood function.
We have done the analysis with two measures of net wealth. The first measure we
refer to as ‘net liquid wealth’. It is defined in the data section. The second measure
adds the value of the house and subtracts the amount of the mortgage debt outstanding,
and we refer to it as ‘net total wealth’ in the sequel. Table 6 displays the estimation
results for net liquid wealth, while Table 7 shows the results for net total wealth. As
instruments for wealth, we have included the indicators for income development and
financial situation in the past 12months and the indicators for the feeling whether it
is a good time to make large expenditures. We have also estimated the model with an
extended set of instruments, adding the indicators for how well the household is able
to ‘make ends meet’. We do not show estimation results of the latter results in any
tables, but we report on the outcomes in the sequel.
We start by discussing the results obtained with net liquid wealth. Table 6a shows
the parameter estimates of involuntary job exits. In the left columns, we show restricted
estimation results, obtained by setting all correlations in the random effects between
job exits, wealth, and initial labour market state equal to zero. The right columns show
the estimates that allow for an unrestricted correlation in the unobserved random
effects. Theoretical considerations in Sect. 3.1 suggest that involuntary job exits are
mainly led by demand side factors and health status and are not the (direct) result
of choice. The estimates in Table 6a are in accordance with that view. Net wealth
has a positive but insignificant effect on involuntary job exits, irrespective of whether
or not we allow for correlation in unobservables. The parameter γI measures the
impact of the random effect αi on the job exit rate (see the expression for the job
exit rates in (3)). We see that the parameter γI is significantly different from zero.
This indicates that there are time-invariant unobservable factors that make workers
that exit involuntarily different from workers that stay on the job during the sample
period. As discussed before, workers that exit may have unfavourable characteristics,
like a lower productivity possibly, that make them more likely to end up in the state of
unemployment or disability. To see whether the random effects affecting involuntary
job exit are correlated with the random effects in wealth and initial conditions, we
check the estimates of the correlation coefficients corresponding to (7), shown in
Table 6e. There is a negative correlation between the random effect in wealth and the
random effect of job exits (see coefficient ραω). Together with the positive coefficient
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Table 6 Estimates of the random effects model with net liquid wealth
Variable No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations
Estimate SE Estimate SE
(a) The involuntary job exit rate
Intercept 1.08 1.09 0.99 1.09
Ln (Age/48) 14.56 7.64 14.69 7.66
Ln (Age/48) Squared −50.94** 33.38 −50.91** 33.38
Education (reference level 5, highest)
Education level 1
(lowest)
0.40 0.92 0.31 0.91
Education level 2 −1.39* 0.79 −1.34* 0.79
Education level 3 −0.37 0.58 −0.29 0.59
Education level 4 −0.40 0.62 −0.34 0.62
Education sector (reference: services)
Technical 0.38 0.44 0.38 0.44
Economic/administrative 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.47
General −0.34 0.64 −0.26 0.64
No children in household −0.10 0.33 −0.13 0.33
Marital status (reference: single)
Married −1.28** 0.58 −1.31** 0.59
Divorced −1.30 0.83 −1.35 0.83
Widow −0.51 1.09 −0.61 1.12
Civil servant −0.55 0.41 −0.57 0.41
Part. in employee pension
scheme
−0.96 0.68 −0.96 0.68
Unknown whether part. in
pens. scheme
0.68 0.70 0.70 0.69
Worker pays premium
directly
1.87** 0.90 1.87** 0.90
Pension premium (if
paying directly)
10.005 0.005 −0.005 0.005
Missing premium amount
(if paying directly)
−0.33 1.89 −0.47 1.90
Employer attributes to
premium
0.83 0.56 0.88 0.57
Permanent job −2.38** 0.45 −2.40** 0.45
Part. in individual pension
scheme




−0.0003 0.001 −0.0004 0.001
Health (reference: bad)
Very good health −3.26** 0.69 −3.33** 0.69
Good health −2.67** 0.53 −2.73** 0.53
Reasonable health −2.33** 0.57 −2.39** 0.58
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Table 6 continued
No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Years (reference: 2001)
1995 0.42 0.49 0.46 0.50
1996 0.16 0.51 0.19 0.51
1997 −0.18 0.52 −0.15 0.52
1998 −0.50 0.54 −0.51 0.54
1999 −0.51 0.53 −0.55 0.53
2000 −0.68 0.55 −0.68 0.55
Monthly earnings 0.020 0.037 0.022 0.036
Non-labour income excl.
asset inc./1000
0.019 0.075 0.011 0.075
Δ Non-labour
income/1000
0.0094 0.020 0.0091 0.019
Net liquid wealth/10,000 0.0016 0.011 0.0093 0.011
γI (parameter random
effect)
0.98** 0.33 1.02** 0.34
(b) The job exit rate with destination (early) retirement
Intercept −13.04** 1.77 −13.14** 1.80
Ln (Age/48) 34.92** 10.12 35.15** 10.19
Ln (Age/48) Squared −13.11 29.61 −13.01 29.86
Education (reference level 5, highest)
Education level 1
(lowest)
1.35** 0.67 1.37** 0.68
Education level 2 1.70** 0.59 1.69** 0.60
Education level 3 1.69** 0.56 1.65** 0.56
Education level 4 0.85 0.56 0.83 0.56
Education sector (reference: services)
Technical 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.28
Economic/administrative 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31
General 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.38
No children in household 0.41* 0.24 0.40* 0.24
Marital status (reference: single)
Married 1.39 1.11 1.41 1.12
Divorced 1.07 1.15 1.10 1.16
Widow 1.69 1.23 1.71 1.25
Civil servant 0.37 0.24 0.38 0.24
Part. in employee pension
scheme
−0.14 0.42 −0.14 0.42
Unknown whether part. in
pens. scheme
0.76 0.62 0.78 0.62
Worker pays premium
directly
0.50 0.56 0.51 0.56
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Table 6 continued
No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Pension premium (if
paying directly)
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Missing premium amount
(if paying directly)
2.37** 1.20 2.37** 1.22
Employer attributes to
premium
−0.22 0.27 −0.23 0.28
Permanent job 1.50** 0.61 1.56** 0.62
Part. in individual pension
scheme




0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Health (reference: bad)
Very good health 0.14 0.73 0.18 0.81
Good health 0.00 0.69 0.06 0.77
Reasonable health −0.03 0.71 0.03 0.78
Years (reference: 2001)
1995 0.96** 0.40 0.95** 0.40
1996 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.41
1997 1.01** 0.37 1.00** 0.37
1998 0.56 0.38 0.56 0.38
1999 0.25 0.39 0.25 0.39
2000 0.27 0.37 0.27 0.37
Monthly earnings 0.030 0.026 0.027 0.026
Non-labour income excl.
asset inc./1000
−2.96** 1.25 −2.97** 1.25
Δ Non-labour
income/1000
0.052 0.039 0.058 0.043
Net liquid wealth/10,000 0.012* 0.007 0.009 0.007
γR (parameter random
effect)
−0.36 0.22 −0.39* 0.21
(c) The wealth equation, dependent variable: inverse hyperbolic sine of wealth/10,000
θ (parameter of
transformation)
0.74** 0.03 0.74** 0.03
Intercept 2.20** 0.37 2.22** 0.37
Ln (Age/48) 2.45** 1.12 2.41** 1.12
Ln (Age/48) Squared 2.67 4.19 2.84 4.20
Education (reference level 5, highest)
Education level 1 (lowest) −1.27** 0.20 −1.27** 0.20
Education level 2 −0.90** 0.16 −0.90** 0.16
Education level 3 −0.85** 0.15 −0.85** 0.15
Education level 4 −0.25 0.16 −0.24 0.16
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Table 6 continued
No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Education sector (reference: services)
Technical 0.21** 0.10 0.21** 0.10
Economic/administrative 0.28** 0.10 0.28** 0.10
General 0.22* 0.13 0.22* 0.13
No children in household 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.10
Number of children in
household
0.10* 0.05 0.10* 0.05
Marital status (reference: single)
Married −0.39 0.27 −0.39 0.27
Divorced −0.91** 0.29 −0.92** 0.29
Single −0.06 0.32 −0.07 0.32
Health (reference: bad)
Very good health 0.47** 0.14 0.47** 0.14
Good health 0.42** 0.13 0.41** 0.13
Reasonable health 0.32** 0.13 0.32** 0.13
Time to make large expenditures (instrument)
Favourable 0.28** 0.07 0.28** 0.07
Neither favourable, nor
unfavourable
0.22** 0.07 0.22** 0.07
Income in the past 12 months (instrument)
Somewhat improved 0.21* 0.12 0.21* 0.12
Remained the same 0.23* 0.12 0.23* 0.12
Somewhat deteriorated 0.30** 0.14 0.29** 0.14
Obviously deteriorated 0.54** 0.19 0.54** 0.19
Financial situation in the past 12 months (instrument)
Somewhat improved −0.30** 0.13 −0.30** 0.13
Remained the same −0.40** 0.13 −0.40** 0.13
Somewhat deteriorated −0.39** 0.14 −0.39** 0.14
Obviously deteriorated −0.65** 0.18 −0.66** 0.19
Years (reference: 2001)
1995 −0.63** 0.08 −0.63** 0.08
1996 −0.54** 0.08 −0.54** 0.08
1997 −0.47** 0.08 −0.47** 0.08
1998 −0.36** 0.07 −0.36** 0.07
1999 −0.22** 0.07 −0.22** 0.07
2000 −0.10 0.07 −0.10 0.07
(d) Initial condition (the employment equation)
Intercept 0.02 0.39 0.02 0.39
Ln (Age/48) 3.61** 1.57 3.60** 1.57
Ln (Age/48) Squared −47.11** 6.05 −47.07** 6.05
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Table 6 continued
No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Education (reference level 5, highest)
Education level 1
(lowest)
−0.96** 0.23 −0.96** 0.23
Education level 2 −0.48** 0.18 −0.48** 0.18
Education level 3 −0.21 0.17 −0.22 0.17
Education level 4 −0.11 0.18 −0.11 0.18
Education sector (reference: services)
Technical 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.11
Eco-
nomic/administrative
0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13
General 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.15
No children in household −0.04 0.15 −0.03 0.15
Number of children 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.08
Marital status (reference: single)
Married 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.25
Divorced −0.08 0.29 −0.08 0.29
Single −0.17 0.30 −0.17 0.30
Non-labour income
lagged
0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
Non-labour income
spouse lagged
−0.031 0.037 −0.032 0.037
Health (reference: bad)
Very good health 1.91** 0.18 1.91** 0.18
Good health 1.86** 0.15 1.86** 0.15
Reasonable health 1.15** 0.15 1.15** 0.15
Years (reference: 2001)
1995 −0.56** 0.17 −0.56** 0.17
1996 −0.37 0.21 −0.37 0.21
1997 −0.34 0.23 −0.34 0.23
1998 −0.26 0.21 −0.26 0.21
1999 −0.40* 0.20 −0.40* 0.20
2000 −0.02 0.20 −0.02 0.20
(e) The covariance matrix
σω (SD random effect
wealth)
1.45** 0.05 1.45** 0.05
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Table 6 continued
No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations





σν (SD error wealth) 1.09** 0.03 1.09** 0.03
**Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level
N = 1759 individuals, NT = 4357 individuals-years
Table 7 Estimates of the random effects model with net total wealth
Variable No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations
Estimate SE Estimate SE
(a) The involuntary job exit rate
Intercept 0.72 1.10 0.62 1.11
Ln (Age/48) 13.65* 7.64 13.96* 7.75
Ln (Age/48) Squared −46.32 33.19 −45.99 33.68
Education (reference level 5, highest)
Education level 1
(lowest)
0.35 0.93 0.30 0.95
Education level 2 −1.15 0.77 −1.12 0.78
Education level 3 −0.28 0.59 −0.22 0.59
Education level 4 −0.33 0.63 −0.30 0.63
Education sector (reference: services)
Technical 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.45
Eco-
nomic/administrative
0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47
General −0.19 0.63 −0.14 0.64
No children in household −0.08 0.33 −0.11 0.34
Marital status (reference: single)
Married −1.23** 0.57 −1.24** 0.58
Divorced −1.18 0.81 −1.18 0.82
Widow −0.46 1.06 −0.45 1.07
Civil servant −0.53 0.41 −0.54 0.41
Part. in employee pension
scheme
−0.82 0.69 −0.78 0.69
Unknown whether part. in
pens. scheme
0.63 0.70 0.73 0.71
Worker pays premium
directly
1.78** 0.88 1.75** 0.89
Pension premium (if
paying directly)
−0.004 0.004 −0.004 0.004
Missing premium amount
(if paying directly)
0.04 1.84 0.17 1.82
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Table 7 continued
Variable No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Employer attributes to
premium
0.77 0.56 0.78 0.56
Permanent job −2.43∗∗ 0.47 −2.41∗∗ 0.47
Part. in individual pension
scheme




−0.0002 0.001 −0.0002 0.001
Health (reference: bad)
Very good health −3.24∗∗ 0.69 −3.34∗∗ 0.70
Good health −2.58∗∗ 0.53 −2.68∗∗ 0.54
Reasonable health −2.23∗∗ 0.58 −2.32∗∗ 0.59
Years (reference: 2001)
1995 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.50
1996 0.16 0.51 0.19 0.51
1997 −0.19 0.53 −0.17 0.53
1998 −0.48 0.55 −0.47 0.55
1999 −0.44 0.53 −0.45 0.53
2000 −0.65 0.56 −0.67 0.56
Monthly earnings 0.013 0.038 0.015 0.038
Non-labour income excl.
asset inc./1000
0.002 0.074 −0.001 0.078
Δ Non-labour
income/1000
0.012 0.021 0.011 0.020
Net total wealth/10,000 0.0034 0.0036 0.0051∗ 0.0029
γI (parameter random
effect)
1.04∗∗ 0.33 1.11∗∗ 0.33
(b) The job exit rate with destination (early) retirement
Intercept −13.19∗∗ 1.78 −13.14∗∗ 1.79
Ln (Age/48) 36.87∗∗ 10.20 36.42∗∗ 10.14
Ln (Age/48) Squared −20.52 29.61 −19.45 29.45
Education (reference level 5, highest)
Education level 1
(lowest)
1.42∗∗ 0.67 1.42∗∗ 0.67
Education level 2 1.74∗∗ 0.59 1.73∗∗ 0.59
Education level 3 1.75∗∗ 0.56 1.73∗∗ 0.56
Education level 4 0.89 0.56 0.88 0.56
Education sector (reference: services)
Technical 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.28
Economic/administrative 0.11 0.30 0.12 0.30
General 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.37
123
790 H. G. Bloemen
Table 7 continued
Variable No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations
Estimate SE Estimate SE
No children in household 0.43* 0.24 0.42* 0.24
Marital status (reference: single)
Married 1.30 1.11 1.31 1.12
Divorced 1.08 1.15 1.10 1.16
Widow 1.70 1.23 1.70 1.23
Civil servant 0.33 0.23 0.34 0.23
Part. in employee pension
scheme
−0.11 0.41 −0.11 0.41
Unknown whether part. in
pens. scheme
0.84 0.60 0.84 0.61
Worker pays premium
directly
0.46 0.58 0.46 0.58
Pension premium (if
paying directly)
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Missing premium amount
(if paying directly)
2.38* 1.22 2.36* 1.22
Employer attributes to
premium
−0.24 0.27 −0.25 0.27
Permanent job 1.46** 0.60 1.47** 0.61
Part. in individual pension
scheme




−0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001
Health (reference: bad)
Very good health 0.04 0.78 0.06 0.81
Good health −0.03 0.74 −0.02 0.78
Reasonable health −0.08 0.75 −0.07 0.79
Years (reference: 2001)
1995 1.09** 0.40 1.06** 0.40
1996 0.56 0.40 0.54 0.41
1997 1.12** 0.37 1.10** 0.37
1998 0.66* 0.38 0.64* 0.38
1999 0.32 0.39 0.31 0.39
2000 0.31 0.37 0.30 0.37
Monthly earnings 0.031 0.026 0.030 0.026
Non-labour in come excl.
asset inc./1000
−3.13** 1.24 −3.14** 1.25
Δ Non-labour in
come/1000
0.048 0.038 0.05 0.04
Net total wealth/10,000 0.0064** 0.0030 0.0056* 0.0034
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Table 7 continued
Variable No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations
Estimate SE Estimate SE
γR (parameter random
effect)
−0.23 0.22 −0.22 0.22
(c) The wealth equation, dependent variable: inverse hyperbolic sine of wealth/10,000
θ (parameter of
transformation)
0.15∗∗ 0.01 0.15∗∗ 0.01
Intercept 13.45∗∗ 1.15 13.46∗∗ 1.15
Ln (Age/48) 13.40∗∗ 3.42 13.13∗∗ 3.41
Ln (Age/48) Squared −17.90 12.09 −17.43 12.08
Education (reference level 5, highest)
Education level 1
(lowest)
−4.81∗∗ 0.73 −4.75∗∗ 0.71
Education level 2 −4.64∗∗ 0.55 −4.61∗∗ 0.54
Education level 3 −4.18∗∗ 0.51 −4.16∗∗ 0.50
Education level 4 −1.08∗ 0.55 −1.07∗ 0.55
Education sector (reference: services)
Technical 1.04∗∗ 0.31 1.05∗∗ 0.31
Economic/
administrative
1.46∗∗ 0.31 1.47∗∗ 0.31
General 0.55 0.40 0.55 0.40
No children in household 0.50∗ 0.27 0.48∗ 0.27
Number of children in
household
0.65∗∗ 0.16 0.64∗∗ 0.16
Marital status (reference: single)
Married −0.67 0.70 −0.65 0.72
Divorced −2.87∗∗ 0.78 −2.87∗∗ 0.80
Single −1.00 0.86 −1.01 0.88
Health (reference: bad)
Very good health 0.83∗ 0.43 0.83∗ 0.43
Good health 0.75∗ 0.40 0.74∗ 0.40
Reasonable health 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.41
Time to make large expenditures (instrument)
Favourable 0.33∗ 0.18 0.31∗ 0.18
Neither favourable, nor
unfavourable
0.21 0.19 0.20 0.19
Income in the past 12 months (instrument)
Somewhat improved 0.08 0.31 0.08 0.30
Remained the same 0.13 0.31 0.13 0.31
Somewhat deteriorated 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.37
Obviously deteriorated 1.40∗∗ 0.50 1.45∗∗ 0.50
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Table 7 continued
Variable No correlations: ραω = ρα
 = ρω
 = 0 Unrestricted correlations
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Financial situation in the past 12 months (instrument)
Somewhat improved −0.08 0.32 −0.08 0.32
Remained the same −0.20 0.33 −0.20 0.33
Somewhat deteriorated −0.46 0.37 −0.46 0.36
Obviously deteriorated −1.65** 0.47 −1.63** 0.47
Years (reference: 2001)
1995 −4.47** 0.30 −4.46** 0.30
1996 −3.56** 0.28 −3.57** 0.28
1997 −3.17** 0.25 −3.17** 0.25
1998 −2.27** 0.22 −2.28** 0.22
1999 −1.58** 0.20 −1.58** 0.19
2000 −0.59** 0.17 −0.59** 0.17
(d) The covariance matrix
σω (SD random effect
wealth)
6.36** 0.25 6.35** 0.25











σν (SD error wealth) 2.63** 0.10 2.63** 0.10
**Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level
N = 1759 individuals, NT = 4357 individuals-years
γI , this implies a negative correlation between time-invariant unobservables in wealth
and involuntary job exits. This also explains the somewhat higher coefficient for the
causal effect of wealth on involuntary job exits in the right columns of Table 6a, once
we allow for this negative correlation in unobservables. Apparently, there are negative
unobserved time-invariant worker’s characteristics that go together with lower wealth
levels and a higher probability of involuntary job exit. We may think of lower job
attachment attitude and low productivity. But in total, this negative correlation is
not so strong, since the estimates both with and without allowing for correlation in
random effects show an insignificant positive causal effect of wealth on involuntary job
exit.
In the estimation, we have separated non-labour income obtained from assets from
non-labour income obtained from other resources (see discussion in the data section).
In the job exit probabilities, we include non-labour income from other resources in
levels, while we include the first difference of non-labour income from assets, to
difference out any possible random effects, as an instrument. To avoid endogeneity
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issues, we have not included non-labour income in the wealth equation. We include
a lagged level of non-labour income from other resources in the initial labour market
state.
Looking at the parameter estimates of the involuntary job exit rate in Table 6a,
we see that having a permanent job reduces involuntary job exits. Also the subjective
health indicators add to the explanation of the involuntary job exit rate. Workers with
a very good health have a significantly lower involuntary job exit rate than workers
in bad health (the reference group). The same holds for workers in good health and
reasonable health. We also see that the size of the coefficients of the health indicator
increases monotonically if health status decreases. We see a negative effect of marital
status on involuntary job exits. Further sensitivity analysis with information on the
spouse’s labour market state and the earnings of the spouse (not shown in the table)
showed that this effect is caused by workers with an employed spouse: workers with
an employed spouse have a lower probability to exit involuntarily. Class endogamy
and polarization may be an explanation for this phenomenon.
Table 6b contains the estimates of the job exit rate into retirement. Here we see
a difference in the coefficient of wealth, depending on whether or not we allow for
correlation in random effects between wealth and the job exit probability. If we restrict
correlations in unobservables to zero, net liquid wealth has a positive significant effect
on the job exit rate into (early) retirement (with a p level of 0.06).
If we allow for correlation, the coefficient of wealth gets somewhat smaller and gets
more imprecise. Parameter γR learns us something about the impact of random effects
on job exit into retirement. We see that it is negative and significant at the 10% level
once we allow for correlation in random effects. The negative value of γR , together
with the negative correlation ραω (Table 6e), shows that there is a positive correlation
in unobservables between wealth and job exit into retirement. Apparently, there are
unobserved individual worker effects that go together with both higher wealth levels
and a higher job exit probability into retirement. Oncewe allow for correlation in unob-
servables between wealth and job exit into retirement, we cannot detect a significant
positive ‘causal’ effect of wealth on retirement anymore (interpreting the coefficient
of wealth in the job exit probability as the ‘causal’ effect). As a robustness check,
we also estimated the model with an extended set of instruments, adding informa-
tion about how well households are able to ‘make ends meet’. This information adds
more to the R-squared in the exploratory first-stage wealth regression. The a priori
fear was that this information may more likely be correlated with the random effect
in wealth. In that case, the use of this instrument will bias upward (away from zero)
the causal effect. We estimated the three equations random effects model including
this additional instrument in the wealth equation. However, we found little differ-
ence with the results shown in Table 6: the coefficient of wealth in the probability
of job exit into retirement remained insignificant at the 10% level, while the correla-
tion in random effects between job exits and wealth remained significant at the 10%
level.
Looking at the parameter estimates of the observable characteristics affecting the
job exit into retirement, we see that the job exit rate increases with age. The level
of education has an impact here. The coefficients are not all significant, but show
that workers with lower levels of education have higher job exit rates into retirement.
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This may reflect preferences, but also job properties (jobs for higher educated may
be more interesting). Workers with a permanent job also have a higher exit rate into
retirement, which reflects eligibility to (early) retirement schemes of workers with a
permanent contract. We do not find significant effects of the health indicators. This
does not mean that health does not influence the job exit rate by retirement at all. There
is an indirect effect: involuntary job exit rates are higher for workers with lower health
status, so once an involuntary exit has been realized due to poor health, no exit into
retirement can take place, since the different exit routes are competing risks. But in
comparing job exiters into retirement with job stayers, no impact of health is found.
The information on pension premiums shows no significant effect on the exit rate on
retirement.
Table 6c contains the estimates of the net wealth Eq. (5). The instrumental variables
included in the wealth regression are all significant, as we already reported before
from the exploratory first-stage regressions with OLS (Sect. 3.3). The level of wealth
is lower, the worse is the development of the financial situation in the past 12months.
At first sight, it seems counterintuitive that wealth levels are higher the worse is the
income development in the past 12months. In exploratory regressions, we found out
that the variable actually measures differences between the financial situation in the
past 12months and the income development in the past 12months: these variables
are highly correlated, but ‘income’ generally shows larger shocks than the ‘financial
situation’.Householdswhose income increases, butwhosefinancial situation increases
less, do worse than households whose income increases, and whose financial situation
increases as well.
The level of net liquid wealth increases with age andwith the level of education. Net
liquidwealth differswith themarital status of theworker.Divorcedmenhave the lowest
level of net wealth. For single and widowed men, we do not find much difference. We
see a monotonically increasing pattern in the year dummies: there remain time effects,
even though we include the indicators from Table 6 that are highly correlated with the
business cycle.
Table 6d contains the results for the initial labour market state, while Table 6e
shows the correlation coefficients ρα
 and ρω
 of the unobservables in the initial
state with the exit rates and wealth, respectively. The estimates of the correlation
coefficients are small and close to zero, and not significant, suggesting that selectivity
into non-employment based on unobservables that correlate with wealth and job exits
does not seem to be very relevant here. Indeed, job exit rates before the age of 48
are still very small, and the results in Table 6d show that health, age, and having a
low education level are important observed characteristics explaining selection into
(non)-employment.
Throughout the discussion, we have already referred to Table 6e, showing us the
parameter estimates of the covariance matrix in (7). For ease of interpretation, we
have reparametrized the covariances into their corresponding correlation coefficients.
What remains to be noted from this table is that random effects play an important role
in the explanation of the level of net wealth, as shown by the parameter estimate σω.
The correlation across time periods in the net wealth level, due to the random effect,
is σ 2ω/(σ
2
ω + σ 2ν ) and takes the value 0.64. This shows that there is a lot of household-
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specific correlation in the net wealth level that cannot be explained by the observable
characteristics that appear in the net wealth equation.25
We see some interesting differences between the resultswith the alternativemeasure
of net total wealth (Table 7) and the results obtained with net liquid wealth (Table 6).26
Table 7a shows that once we allow for correlations in unobservables, the coefficient
estimate of wealth in the probability of involuntary job exit becomes significant at the
10% level.We again see that the coefficient γI is positive and significant, showing that
time-persistent unobservable effect plays a role in the involuntary job exit rate. Table 7d
tells us something about the correlations in unobservables between the job exit rates,
wealth, and initial conditions. We see that for net total wealth, the correlations with
the initial condition are more important. Between wealth and the initial condition, we
see a positive and significant correlation coefficient. This correlation is possibly due
to a relationship between employment status and home-ownership, as we did not find
such correlation for net liquid wealth. The estimate for the correlation between initial
employment and involuntary job exit is negative, but not very precise. The same holds
for the correlation between wealth and the involuntary job exit.
Results for the job exit rate into retirement show a positive and significant effect of
net total wealth, which becomes somewhat less precise once we allow for correlations
in unobservables, but still it is significant at the 10% level. The parameter estimate of
γR is negative but insignificant. The latter suggest that job exiters into retirement are,
in terms of unobservables, comparable to job stayers.
Results for thewealth equation (Table 7c) showcomparable effects as before:wealth
decreases with education level and increases with health. The separate coefficients of
the instrumental dummies are not always significant for all response classes, but recall
from the exploratory first-stage regressions that also here the F statistics reveal joint
significance. Also for net total wealth, we have estimated the model with the extended
set of instruments, which add more to the explanation of the wealth level, but there
were no qualitative differences in the outcomes.
Table 7d shows the complete results for the covariance structure. The correlation
across time in unobservables for net total wealth, σ 2ω/(σ
2
ω +σ 2ν ), is 0.85, which shows
a higher persistence in net total wealth that is assigned to unobservables compared to
net liquid wealth. This reflects both the relatively large value of housing equity and
mortgage debt and the relatively illiquid nature of housing equity.
4.2 Testing the exclusion restrictions
Exploiting the fact thatwe havemultiple instruments,we test the exclusion restrictions.
For each instrumental variable, we re-estimate the model, including the instrument in
the job exit rates, and we compute the likelihood ratio test statistic. As an example,
25 This is also the reason why results for the model in this paper can be different from results obtained in
Bloemen (2011), who relies on a rich set of regressors in the exit rates: the observable regressors cannot
absorb all the individual-specific correlation across time in exit rates.
26 For reasons of conciseness, we do not display the estimates for the initial condition in Table 7. For the
case with correlation restricted to zero, the estimates are the same as in Table 6d, while for the unrestricted
case they are not much different.
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Table 8 Testing the exclusion restrictions: likelihood ratio test statistics
Instrumental variable DF χ20.10 χ
2
0.05 Model with
Net liquid wealth Net total wealth
LR LR
Time to make large
expenditures
4 7.8 9.5 2.9 2.5
Income in past 12
months
8 13.4 15.5 9.9 9.8
Financial situation in
past 12 months
8 13.4 15.5 2.8 2.7
Can make ends meet
(extended
instruments set)
8 13.4 15.5 11.1 10.3
DF degrees of freedom, LR value likelihood ratio test statistic
χ2α : critical value Chi-squared distribution 100α% level
consider the instrumental variable derived from the survey question whether it is
the right time to make large expenditures. The survey information was transformed
into dummy indicators for the outcomes ‘favourable’ and ‘neither favourable, nor
unfavourable’, so we add these two dummy variables to the two job exit probabilities,
implying that we need to test whether the corresponding four coefficients are jointly
zero. We test this by computing the likelihood ratio test statistic and comparing it
to critical values of the Chi-squared distribution with 4 degrees of freedom. For the
exclusion restrictions to be valid, they should not show a separate impact on the exit
rates.By including a set of instruments in the exit rates,whilemaintaining the exclusion
restrictions for the remaining instruments, we can test whether they have a separate
impact on the exit rates. The principle of the test is similar to an overidentifying
restrictions or Sargan test, where the availability of multiple instrumental variables
is exploited. An important caveat of these type of tests is that, while for one set of
instruments the exclusion restrictions are being tested, the assumption is maintained
that the remaining instruments are valid. We try to deal with this as best as possible by
circulating the role of the instruments in the tests, and testing for each set of instruments
the overidentifying restrictions.
Tests are performed both for the model variant with net liquid wealth and for
the model variant with net total wealth. Table 8 shows the test statistics for each
instrumental variable. It also shows the relevant number of degrees of freedom and
the corresponding critical values of the Chi-squared distribution at the 10 and the 5%
levels. For all the instruments, the value of the likelihood ratio test statistic is below
the critical value, both at the 5 and at the 10% levels.27 Thus, the exclusion restrictions
are not rejected.
27 This also holds for the instrumental variable ‘can make ends meet’ about which we had the biggest a
priori worries (Sect. 3.3). We do see that this the LR test statistic for testing the exclusion restrictions is the
biggest of all instrumental variables, but its value is still well below the critical value at the 5 and even the
10% level.
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4.3 Decomposition into ‘causal effect’ and ‘bias’: marginal effects and
elasticities
Section 4.1 presented the parameters estimates, and the parameter estimates of
multinomial choice probabilities are related to the relative change in probabilities
due to a change in the variable. In this section, we gain further insight in the sensitivity
of the job exit rates with respect to the level of wealth, by both computing the marginal
effects of wealth on exit rates and by evaluating elasticities. Both the marginal effect
and the elasticities are based on the derivative of the exit rate with respect to the level of
wealth. In ‘Appendix 2’, we show in (18) that we can decompose the derivative of the
exit probability with respect to wealth into a causal effect and a bias. In ‘Appendix 2’,
we show that the derivative consists of three terms: the first term corresponds to the
causal effect and the second and third term to the bias. The latter two terms represent
the effect of wealth on job exits that arises because of correlation in the random effects
between job exits and wealth and initial conditions. The expression measuring this
effect is zero if these correlation coefficients are restricted to zero. Adding up of the
two effects gives the total effect, which may be interpreted as the effect of wealth on
job exit that we get if we ignore the distinction between the causal effect and the effect
that arises due to correlation through unobservables (the bias).
Table 9 shows themarginal effects ofwealth.We have evaluated themarginal effects
for a worker of the age of 58. At the age of 58, most workers have not yet reached
the eligibility age for early retirement,28 but are old enough to consider retirement, so
especially for this group it is interesting to analyse to what extent a different wealth
level can induce them to retire earlier.
The values of the remaining explanatory variables are set to their sample means. To
compare the order of magnitude of the impact of wealth on the job exit probabilities,
we also present the marginal effect for other variables. We show marginal effects for
age, education, health, having a permanent job, and the absence of children in the
household.
The upper part of Table 9 shows the marginal effects on the involuntary exit rate,
while the lower part shows job exits due to retirement. The left two columns show
the results for net liquid wealth, while the results for net total wealth are shown in the
columns at the right side.
In accordance with the estimation results in Tables 6a and 7a, no significant causal
effect of wealth is found on the involuntary exit rates. The impact is also small in
magnitude. It is interesting to see that the bias effect of wealth on involuntary job exits
is negative. This is consistent with the story that a higher level of wealth may proxy for
favourable personal characteristics, making it less likely that the workers exit by the
involuntary exit route. The opposite signs in bias and causal effect make the total effect
negative. Having opposite signs for bias and causal effect may be a reason why it is
difficult to find accurate estimates of wealth on involuntary exits. The table shows the
bigger (negative) effects of a better health and having a permanent job on involuntary
exits.
28 The age of eligibility for early retirement in the Netherlands varies across workers from different sectors,
and depending on the sector, starts at the age of 60.
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Table 9 Marginal effects of selected variables evaluated at age 58, and sample means
Variable: Results with net liquid wealth Results with net total wealth
Marginal effects on the involuntary exit rate
Causal effect wealth 0.00010 (0.00012) 0.000060 (0.000041)
‘Bias’ effect wealth −0.00035 (0.00022) −0.000084 (0.000084)
Total effect wealth −0.00025 (0.00021) −0.000024 (0.000074)





0.0026 (0.0106) 0.0027 (0.0121)
Education level 2 −0.0166 (0.0102) −0.0157 (0.0107)
Education level 3 −0.0045 (0.0068) −0.0042 (0.0076)
Education level 4 −0.0045 (0.0073) −0.0045 (0.0081)
No children in
household
−0.0018 (0.0040) −0.0017 (0.0045)
Permanent job −0.029** (0.010) −0.032** (0.011)
Health (reference: bad)
Very good health −0.038** (0.013) −0.043** (0.015)
Good health −0.031** (0.011) −0.034** (0.012)
Reasonable health −0.028** (0.011) −0.029** (0.012)
Marginal effects on the (early) retirement rate
Causal effect wealth 0.00071 (0.00052) 0.00040* (0.00024)
‘Bias’ effect wealth 0.00088 (0.00072) 0.00009 (0.00013)
Total effect wealth 0.00159** (0.00080) 0.00050** (0.00025)





0.10* (0.06) 0.10** (0.05)
Education level 2 0.13** (0.05) 0.13** (0.05)
Education level 3 0.13** (0.05) 0.13** (0.05)
Education level 4 0.06* (0.04) 0.06 (0.04)
No children in
household
0.031* (0.017) 0.031* (0.016)
Permanent job 0.12** (0.05) 0.11** (0.05)
Health (reference: bad)
Very good health 0.016 (0.062) 0.007 (0.059)
Good health 0.006 (0.059) 0.001 (0.057)
Reasonable health 0.004 (0.060) −0.003 (0.058)
Includes decomposition of the total effect into causal effect and bias
Wealth in units of 10,000
Standard errors (in parentheses) computed by the delta method.
**Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level
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For the retirement exit rate, we find both for net liquidwealth and for net total wealth
a positive and significant total effect, but results differ if we look at the decomposition.
For net liquid wealth, we see that it is difficult to distinguish the causal effect from
the bias on job exit into retirement. The total effect is positive and significant, but
the causal effect and the bias are roughly of equal size. To interpret the magnitude of
the causal effect, we may do a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation to answer the
question how big an increase in net liquid wealth we need to raise the retirement rate
by 1%point: we approximately need an increase inwealth by 0.01/0.00071 (in units of
10,000 guilders) which corresponds to an increase in wealth by roughly 64,000 euros.
This is a large number, but falls well within the sample variation that we reported in
Table 1.29
For net total wealth, the bias is much smaller compared to the causal effect, and the
causal effect ismore precisely estimated. Doing a similar calculation for themagnitude
of the causal effect of net total wealth on the retirement rate, to get an increase in the
retirement rate by 1% point, we roughly need an increase in net total wealth by
0.01/0.00040 (in units of 10,000 guilders) corresponding to an increase in net liquid
wealth by roughly 110,000 euros, which is a large number but at the same time a
number that is well within the limits of the sample variation. This order of magnitude
can easily measure the difference between someone with a below average valued
house, and someone with a more expensive house.
For some other covariates, we find bigger effects: we find an increasing impact of
age, and individuals with university level of education are more likely to stay on the
job longer. It matters whether there are no children in the household anymore, and
workers with a regular, permanent job are more likely to make use of the retirement
exit route. Health does not have much impact on exit by retirement anymore.
Table 9 shows the absolute changes in the exit probability due to changes in wealth.
Another way of exposing the impact of wealth is by computing elasticities. The upper
part of Table 10 displays the elasticities for net liquid wealth. Standard errors are in
brackets. Conform the findings for the marginal effects, the elasticity for the causal
effect of net liquid wealth on job exit is not significant for either exit route. The same
holds for the elasticity for the unobservable correlation. For job exits into retirement,
the elasticity of the effect of net liquid wealth running through the unobservables
is just somewhat larger than the causal effect. Interestingly, adding the two effects
together shows a positive and significant association between net liquid wealth and
the transition into retirement. This indicates that there is a negative correlation between
the estimates of the separate parts, which leads to a smaller standard error for the sum.
The value of the elasticity of the total effect is comparable to results obtained by
Bloemen (2011), who ignores the role of unobservables. The results show that it is
difficult to empirically disentangle the total effect, which is estimated precisely, into
the causal effect and the biaswhich are both estimated imprecisely. Note, though, that
29 To place this number of 64,000 in perspective, we computed the mean yearly personal net wage income
for the workers in the sample, which is around 25,700 euros. This means that a net wealth of 2.5 times the
annual net income raises the retirement rate of a 58-year-old worker by 1% point. This order of magnitude
is not unappealing given the fact that someone retiring at age 58 without yet being eligible for pensions still
needs to bridge some years before pension eligibility.
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Effect wealth running through
unobservables (‘bias’)
Total effect wealth
(sum col. 1 + 2)
Decomposing the total effect into causal effect and bias
Net liquid wealth
Exit to retirement 0.055 0.069 0.12**
(0.041) (0.053) (0.06)
Involuntary exit 0.054 −0.17 −0.12
(0.063) (0.11) (0.10)
Net total wealth
Exit to retirement 0.15* 0.035 0.18**
(0.09) (0.046) (0.09)
Involuntary exit 0.13* −0.17 −0.044
(0.075) (0.17) (0.15)
**Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level
the separate coefficients in Table 6 seemed to indicate that the impact of net liquid
wealth running through unobservables is somewhat more important than the causal
impact. For the involuntary job exit, we see a negative value of the elasticity of the
net liquid wealth effect running through the unobservables, which is quite a bit larger
than the causal effect. For both the total effect and the causal effect and the bias, the
elasticities of the involuntary job exit probabilities with respect to net liquid wealth
are estimated imprecisely, such that we cannot conclude that there is any impact of
wealth on involuntary job exit.30
The lower part of Table 10 shows the results for net total wealth. For this measure
of wealth, we find a causal elasticity for the probability of exit into retirement of 0.15,
which is estimated significantly at the 10% level. There is also a positive value assigned
to elasticity job exit due to unobservables (the bias), but this is much smaller than the
causal effect, and not significant. The value of the total elasticity is 0.18 and significant
at the 5% level, somewhat larger than the estimated elasticity for the causal effect, but
taking the standard errors into consideration, wewould notmake a largemistake here if
the distinction between causal effects and effects running through unobservables were
ignored. The value of this total elasticity is again quite close to the value obtained in
Bloemen (2011), ignoring correlation in unobservables. Interestingly, for the causal
elasticity of the involuntary job exit probability with respect to net total wealth we find
a value of 0.13, which is significant at the 10% level. The effect of unobservables is
negative, and the estimated total elasticity is quite close to zero.31
30 The standard errorswere computed using the deltamethod, and represent the variation due to the variance
in the parameters.
31 We also computed the elasticities for the estimates obtained with the extended instrument set (adding
the variable ‘can make ends meet’) (Table 11). The values do not differ much from the results in Table 9,
and conclusions remain the same.
123
Private wealth and job exit at older age: a random effects. . . 801
5 Conclusions
We analysed the effect of private wealth on job exit at older age. We constructed a
model framework that allows us to decompose the total effect of private wealth into
a causal effect and an effect that is channelled through correlation in time-invariant
unobservables, the bias. Our model is a simultaneous dynamic panel data model with
random effects, with equations for job exit into several destinations, net wealth, and
an initial condition. We instrument wealth with survey information that varies with
business cycle shocks, and we perform statistical tests for the exclusion restrictions,
exploiting the fact that we have multiple instrumental variables. The exclusion restric-
tions are not rejected by the test. We present results using net liquid wealth and net
total wealth (excluding the value of the house and the outstanding mortgage debt).
Results are robust if an extended set of instrumental variables is used.
Results for the total effect, adding up the causal effect and the bias, are close
to results obtained in a study by Bloemen (2011), which is completely based on
observable regressors and ignores potential correlation in unobservables. The total
effect shows a positive and significant impact of wealth into retirement, and no effect
of wealth on involuntary job exit, for both measures of net wealth. However, for net
liquidwealth estimation results reveal a correlation between unobservables in exit rates
and net wealth, and the total effect is biased upward for retirement and downward for
involuntary job exits. The decomposition of the elasticity into a causal effect and a
bias shows that we get a precise estimate neither for the causal effect nor for the
bias.
For net total wealth, the causal effect on retirement is positive, while correlation in
unobservables between job exit rates and net total wealth is not detected. One possible
explanation for the more pronounced effect of net total wealth on retirement is that
net total wealth contains more variation than net liquid wealth. Another explanation
may lay in the nature of housing equity and mortgage debt itself. A higher outstanding
mortgage debt may provide an additional incentive to stay on the job. Housing wealth
is illiquid in the short run and can be made liquid only by selling the house. In this
respect, housing wealth is closer to pension wealth, which is also illiquid and only
becomes available upon eligibility in the shape of income provision (As opposed to
pension wealth, it may be possibly to borrow against housing equity.).
Computation of marginal effects revealed that we need fairly large increases in
wealth levels to find an ‘economically significant’ impact on retirement rates (of,
say, 1% point), but on the other hand those increases are well within the sample
variation. For an average individual with age 58, we computed that if net liquid wealth
is increased by 64,000 euros, or net total wealth by 110,000 euros, the exit rate into
retirement can be raised by 1% point. Once pension systems become more flexible
in terms of eligibility and the choice of the retirement age, net wealth may become
an increasingly important factor in the choice to retire, and policy makers should be
aware that policy measures to induce workers to stay on the job and retire later may be
partially offset for workers with a sufficiently high net (total) wealth level. However,
from a point of view of public finance, that should not be a problem if retiring earlier
is accounted for in an actuarially fair way.
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Appendix 1: Likelihood contributions
We first determine the likelihood contributions, conditional on the random effects
(αi , ωi ) in (3) and (5). The density of the 
i t in the initial condition (6), conditional
on (αi , ωi ) follows from (7) and is normal with mean μ




(αi , ωi ) ≡ 1
σ 2ασ
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Let Ti1 be the first year in which individual i is observed and selected into the sample.
The probability that the observed labour market state is employment, conditional on
(αi , ωi ), is
P(diTi1 = 1|miTi1 , αi , ωi ) = Φ
(





If the labour market state is non-employment the assigned probability will be
P(diTi1 = 0|miTi1 , αi , ωi ) = 1− P(diTi1 = 1|miTi1 , αi , ωi ). We follow the employed
individuals to trackwhether or not a job exit occurs. The assigned transition probability
P(di,t+1 = J |dit = E, xit , αi ) indicates that the individual is employed in year t and
is in labour market state J in the subsequent year with J ∈ {E, R, I }. The probability
is defined in (3).
The density of wealth, conditional on the random effects, can be derived from (5)
and (7). We can write











with φ(.) the standard normal density function.
For an individual i who is initially employed, andobserved from Ti1 throughTi2, and
does not make a transition during this period, the likelihood contribution li (αi , ωi )32
is
32 In general, a likelihood function is a function of the model parameters, conditional on the data. For
reasons of conciseness, we suppress the arguments in the notation.
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li (αi , ωi ) = P(diTi1 = 1|miTi1 , αi , ωi )
Ti2∏
t=Ti1
P(di,t+1 = E |dit
= E, xit , αi ) f (Ait |zit , ωi ) (12)
For an individual i who is initially employed, and observed to stay employed from
Ti1 through Ti2 but makes a transition from year Ti2 to Ti2 +1 into state of destination
J, J = I, R the likelihood contribution conditional on random effects is
li (αi , ωi ) = P(diTi1 = 1|miTi1 , αi , ωi )
∏Ti2−1
t=Ti1 P(di,t+1= E |dit = E, xit , αi ) f (Ait |zit , ωi )
×P(di,Ti2+1 = J |diTi2 = E, xiTi2 , αi ) f (AiTi2 |ziTi2 , ωi )
(13)
For initially non-employed individuals, we only have the initial condition and the
wealth level. Note that the likelihood contribution of the non-employed does not
involve the labourmarket transition probabilities (3), and therefore, it can be simplified
by integrating over αi , or equivalently, by using the density of 
iTi1 conditional on ωi
only. For generality of notation, we keep αi in our expression. So for non-employed
individuals, we have:
li (αi , ωi ) = P(diTi1 = 0|miTi1, αi , ωi ) f (AiTi1 |ziTi1 , ωi ) (14)
The likelihood contribution can be completed by integrating over the joint density of
(αi , ωi ) which is normal and follows from (7). If we denote the density function by






li (αi , ωi ) f (αi , ωi )dαidωi (15)
In the estimation, we replace the integration in (15) by simulation. We draw R ran-
dom numbers (αir , ωir ), r = 1, ..., R from its joint distribution, and we compute the
simulated likelihood contribution li R as




li (αir , ωir ) (16)
In our application, we have set R = 60.
Appendix 2: Comparison instruments and business cycle fluctuations
Amotivation for choosing the instrumental variables discussed in Sect. 3.3 is that these
variables represent shocks. In this appendix, we compare the time patterns found in the
aggregate descriptives of the survey variables with business cycle indicators. Table 11
shows for our sample the sample frequencies of the outcomes by wave, for the years
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Table 11 Observed time patterns in instruments for wealth
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Financial situation in the past 12 months
Obviously improved 2.0 3.7 3.7 4.3 4.9 6.3 8.2
Somewhat improved 14.8 17.5 22.8 27.0 26.9 31.7 37.4
Remained the same 59.2 59.7 57.4 55.7 53.2 50.9 44.3
Somewhat
deteriorated
17.5 13.8 12.9 10.7 11.6 9.0 7.7
Obviously
deteriorated
6.6 5.3 3.2 2.3 3.5 2.2 2.5
Summary: −7 2 10 18 17 27 35
Income in the past 12months
Obviously improved 3.2 5.0 3.9 3.6 5.4 6.0 9.1
Somewhat improved 20.4 25.2 26.2 35.0 32.9 36.5 44.9
Remained the same 57.7 56.9 60.4 50.0 49.2 49.5 37.4
Somewhat
deteriorated
13.2 9.9 6.7 9.5 9.7 5.8 6.5
Obviously
deteriorated
5.5 3.0 2.8 1.9 2.9 2.2 2.0
Summary: 5 17 21 27 26 34 46
Time to make large expenditures
Favourable 30.5 35.0 49.9 61.6 60.1 62.8 48.4
Neither favourable,
nor unfavourable
46.0 43.5 38.9 27.9 32.6 28.4 37.8
Unfavourable 23.5 21.6 11.2 10.6 7.4 8.8 13.8
Summary: 7 13 39 51 53 54 35
Can make ends meet
Very difficult 2.1 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.5 1.3 0.5
Difficult 7.7 4.6 3.2 2.9 4.2 3.0 3.3
Somewhat difficult 16.8 13.8 12.5 10.0 9.9 9.0 9.7
Somewhat easy 21.3 25.4 26.7 23.7 23.0 25.0 21.0
Easy 42.7 44.0 44.3 49.0 49.8 46.9 48.6
Very easy 9.4 10.9 12.3 13.5 12.6 14.8 17.0
Summary: 47 61 67 72 71 74 73
Aggregate time series on:
Consumer
confidence**
4 1 15 17 14 24 −1
Index numbers prices
in may of mutual
and real estate
funds, 1993=100**
85 109 143 176 199 285 242
**This is aggregate time series information, obtained from Statistics Netherlands, Statline
The line ‘Summary’ provides the balance of positive and negative answers
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1995 through 2001. Since these are unweighted sample frequencies, the exposed year-
to-year variation combines pure time effects and wave-to-wave sample variation. To
compare the observed time pattern in our sample indicatorswith indicators for the busi-
ness cycle, the lower part of Table 11 shows two aggregate time series obtained from
Statistics Netherlands, Statline. It shows series for consumer confidence and a series
of index numbers of the prices of shares of mutual and real estate funds (1993=100).
We have chosen consumer confidence as a series for comparison because the consumer
confidence measured by Statistics Netherlands is partly based on the same underlying
questions as we observe in our sample, like the development of the financial situation
in the past 12months, and the view whether it is a suitable time to make large expendi-
tures. Shocks in prices of shares are often viewed as a source of exogenous variation to
households’ financial wealth. Needless to say, across households there is quite some
heterogeneity in portfolio composition and many households do not even own shares,
but to compare our sample indicators with the observed changes in wealth gives us an
indication whether there is a similar year to year pattern observed. To further enhance
the comparison, we have summarized the information of our sample indicators by
showing the balance of positive and negative outcomes33 to the questions (see row
‘Summary’ in Table 11).
Overall, we can say that the observed year to year variation in our indicators resem-
bles the pattern observed in the aggregate time series: we see a recovery in the years
1995 and 1996, flattening around 1998–1999, and a further rise in 2000. For both the
aggregate time series and the sample indicators for the time tomake large expenditures
and whether households can make ends meet, we see a decrease in the final year 2001.
We do not observe this decrease for the indicators of the income and financial situation
in the past 12 months, but these indicators are by definition lagged indicators for the
business cycle. A priori we thought it less likely that the sample information displaying
whether households are able to make ends meet represents shocks, but Table 11 shows
yearly variation with the business cycle in this series as well.
Appendix 3: Evaluating the transition probability for computing the elas-
ticity
To evaluate elasticities of job exit rates with respect to the level of wealth, we can take
the derivative of the job exit probability with respect to wealth. The expression for
the exit probability as modelled in (3), though, contains the unobserved random effect
and is conditional on employment as the initial labour market state. We therefore need
to integrate over the random effect to obtain a ‘marginal’ expression for the transition
probability (marginal with respect to the random effect). Keeping the same notation
as in ‘Appendix 1’, the expression for the probability becomes
33 This is a procedure that is also followed by Statistics Netherlands in producing figures of aggregate
consumer confidence.
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−∞ P(di,t+1 = J |dit = E, xit , αi ) f (Ait |zit , ωi )P(dit = 1|mit , αi , ωi ) f (αi , ωi )dαidωi∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞ f (Ait |zit , ωi )P(dit = 1|mit , αi , ωi ) f (αi , ωi )dαidωi
(17)
The expression in the denominator appears because the probability of interest is a
conditional probability, conditional on net wealth Ait and conditional on the initial
labour market state of employment. If the random effect αi in the transition probability
is uncorrelated with the random effect ωi in wealth and the initial condition, we can
write the double integral as amultiplication of two single integrals and the denominator
in (17) cancels against part of the numerator. For computing the elasticity, we take the
derivative of (17) with respect to wealth, realizing that wealth Ait is included among
the regressors xit in the transition probability:






∂P(di,t+1=J |dit=E,xi t ,αi )
∂Ait
f (Ait |zit ,ωi )P(dit=1|mit ,αi ,ωi ) f (αi ,ωi )dαidωi∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞





−∞ P(di,t+1=J |dit=E,xit ,αi ) ∂ f (Ait |zi t ,ωi )∂Ait P(dit=1|mit ,αi ,ωi ) f (αi ,ωi )dαidωi∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞ f (Ait |zit ,ωi )P(dit=1|mit ,αi ,ωi ) f (αi ,ωi )dαidωi





∂ f (Ait |zi t ,ωi )
∂Ait
P(dit=1|mit ,αi ,ωi ) f (αi ,ωi )dαidωi∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞ f (Ait |zit ,ωi )P(dit=1|mit ,αi ,ωi ) f (αi ,ωi )dαidωi
(18)
The first term of the derivative in (18) actually measures the ‘causal’ effect of net
wealth on the transition probability. It is the effect that is measured by the size of the
regression coefficient of net wealth in the transition probability. The final two terms
of the derivative (18) measure the impact of wealth on the transition probability that
is due to the correlation in unobservables between the job exit probability, wealth, and
the initial condition. This latter effect is zero if ραω = ρα
 = 0. So if we want to
evaluate the elasticity of the causal effect of wealth, we need to base computations on
the first term only. It can be fun, though, to see how large will be the total effect of
wealth on the transition probability, adding the ‘causal’ effect and the effect due to
unobservables together, and how large is the separate effect due to unobservables. This
will give us a feeling of the ‘bias’ in quantifying the effect of wealth on job exit that
is made in an analysis where no correction for selectivity on basis of unobservables
takes place.
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